Appearance, discrimination, and reaction qualifications by Mason, Andrew
  
 
 
 
warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications 
 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Mason, Andrew. (2016) Appearance, discrimination, and reaction qualifications. Journal of 
Political Philosophy.  
 
Permanent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/79127                    
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.  Copyright © 
and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual 
author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  To the extent reasonable and practicable the 
material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before being made 
available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge.  Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
Publisher’s statement: 
"This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Mason, Andrew. (2016) 
Appearance, discrimination, and reaction qualifications. Journal of Political Philosophy. 
which has been published in final form at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12099 This article 
may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions 
for Self-Archiving." 
 
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or, version of record, if 
you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version.  Please see the 
‘permanent WRAP URL’ above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk 
 
 Appearance, Discrimination, and Reaction Qualifications* 
 
ANDREW MASON 
Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick 
 
 
When are selectors for advantaged social positions morally justified in giving weight to 
the appearance of the candidates?1 In order to address this issue adequately, we need to 
know when a person’s appearance can be a legitimate qualification for a position. Some 
of the hardest cases are jobs that involve interacting with clients or customers who prefer 
to deal with good-looking employees or who respond more favourably to them. But there 
is also a wide range of difficult cases in which an unconventional appearance, rather than 
good looks as such, provokes a response in others, for example, facial tattoos or 
piercings, and hairstyles that involve dreadlocks, braids, or bright colouration. In these 
cases we need to know whether an appearance of this kind can legitimately count against 
applicants when the clientele with whom they will be dealing have conservative attitudes 
and would be better disposed towards more conventional-looking employees. 
                                                 
 
*I would like to thank Chris Armstrong, Cheshire Calhoun, Matthew Clayton, Bob Goodin, Deborah 
Hellman, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Tom Parr, Shlomi Segall, Adam Slavny, Hillel Steiner, and 
the journal’s referees, for their constructive written comments on one or more drafts of this article. It 
was also presented in one form or another at various workshops and colloquia: I would like to thank 
participants in them at Goethe University Frankfurt, the University of Manchester, Nuffield College, 
Oxford, and the University of Warwick, for their probing questions. The final versions were written 
whilst I was a visiting fellow at the Justitia Amplificata Centre for Advanced Studies at Goethe 
University. I would like to thank Rainer Forst for inviting me, and the fellows and staff at the 
Forschungskolleg Humanwissenschaften for making my period of residence there so enjoyable and 
productive. 
1This is an important question not least because there is a body of evidence that suggests those who are 
regarded as attractive earn larger incomes over their lives than those who are similarly qualified but 
regarded as less attractive, which raises the issue of whether the latter are the victims of injustice. 
See D. S. Hamermesh, Beauty Pays: Why Attractive People Are More Successful (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2011), especially part II.  
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 The issues here are further complicated by the fact that appearance norms, that is, 
norms governing how we should look, may themselves be sources of injustice. These 
norms are often gender-specific. The material and psychological costs that women bear in 
trying to conform to them—and the costs they have to bear if they refuse to do so—are 
often much greater for them than for men.2 Furthermore, the ideals of attractiveness that 
provide content to appearance norms may be ‘racialised’, with lighter skin regarded as 
more appealing than darker skin, and hairstyles that are suited to the natural properties of 
the hair prevalent in particular racial groups regarded as unkempt.3 This makes the issue 
of when the possession of an appearance that others find attractive, or at least, not off-
putting, can be a legitimate qualification for a job especially important because counting 
it may exacerbate already existing forms of unjust disadvantage.4   
 The questions I am raising take us into the realm of what Alan Wertheimer termed 
‘reaction qualifications’, that is, qualifications that count as such because of the reactions 
of recipients, where the recipients are those with whom the successful candidate will 
interact as a result of filling the relevant position—and indeed they would cease to be 
qualifications if the recipients’ reactions changed in relevant ways.5 Accordingly, I 
approach these questions by exploring different accounts of how we should distinguish 
                                                 
2For relevant discussion, see C. Chambers, Sex, Culture, and Justice (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 2008), especially ch. 3; S. Jeffreys, Beauty and Misogyny (London: 
Routledge, 2005); D. Rhode, The Beauty Bias: The Injustice of Appearance in Life and Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), especially ch. 2; N. Wolf, The Beauty Myth (London: 
Vintage, 1990); H. Widdows, ‘Beauty, choice and exploitation’ (unpublished paper). 
3See Rhode, The Beauty Bias, p. 96; J. Kang, ‘Deconstructing the ideology of white aesthetics’, Michigan 
Journal of Race and Law, 2 (1997), 283–359. 
4See Rhode, The Beauty Bias, pp. 95–9. 
5See A. Wertheimer, ‘Jobs, qualifications, and preference’, Ethics, 94 (1983), 99–112. Like Wertheimer, I 
treat reaction qualifications as genuine qualifications. Scepticism has been expressed about the very 
notion of a qualification, however. In order to give it content we need to be able to describe what a 
job involves, but there may be different views about the point or purpose of a job that will generate 
different job descriptions. My argument in what follows does not rely on the idea of a qualification 
in any deep way; it could be reformulated in terms of ‘reasons for appointing candidates’. For 
relevant discussion, see D. Hellman, When Is Discrimination Wrong? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2008), pp. 98–101; I. M. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 201–6. For a response to Young, see B. Barry, Culture 
and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism (Cambridge: Polity, 2001), pp. 98–103. 
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qualifications of this kind that are legitimate from those that are illegitimate (sections II–
III), before advancing my own hybrid account that I argue makes better sense of some 
widely shared considered judgements (section IV). I then use this account to illuminate a 
range of cases in which appearance is a reaction qualification that are likely to involve 
greater disagreement (section V).  
 
I. The Issue 
 
Let me stipulate that a reaction qualification is legitimate if and only if there is no 
weighty moral reason not to count it, whereas it is illegitimate if and only if there is a 
weighty moral reason not to count it. This way of drawing the distinction between 
legitimate and illegitimate reaction qualifications leaves open the possibility that even 
though a reaction qualification is illegitimate, there are cases in which counting it is 
morally justified all things considered. I shall return to this issue in section VI. It also 
leaves open the possibility that some reaction qualifications may be legitimate even 
though there is a non-weighty moral reason not to count them. These non-weighty 
reasons would need to be taken into account in making all things considered judgements 
about whether we are justified in counting a reaction qualification. 
 Before we can determine when, if at all, a person’s appearance can be a legitimate 
reaction qualification, we need a better understanding of what makes a reaction 
qualification legitimate or illegitimate. It is instructive to begin with what I shall refer to 
as core cases where we are relatively confident about how to draw the distinction: 
Normal Customers. Customers prefer to be served by sales assistants who are 
polite. As a result, when stores are hiring, they give preference to applicants who 
are disposed to be polite. 
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Prejudiced Customers. The customers of a department store are prejudiced against 
those from a particular ethnic group. They prefer not to be served by them because 
they believe they are dishonest or untrustworthy. As a result the store has a policy 
of not employing members of this group.  
Women Patients. The women patients registered at a medical practice would prefer 
to consult a doctor of the same sex about gynecological problems even though they 
don’t deny that the medical skills of male doctors are just as good. The practice is 
appointing a new doctor and has no women doctors, so treats being female as a 
qualification. 
In relation to Normal Customers, there is a consensus that there is no moral reason not to 
count politeness as a qualification for the job, in other words that this is a legitimate 
reaction qualification, whilst in relation to Prejudiced Customers, it is almost universally 
agreed that there is a weighty moral reason for the store to refrain from counting ‘not 
being a member of the ethnic group’ as a qualification for working there, in other words 
that this is an illegitimate reaction qualification. I shall treat these judgements as fixed 
points in our deliberations: any adequate account of how we should distinguish 
illegitimate from legitimate reaction qualifications will need to be able to make sense of 
our judgements about these cases. The other core case is more contentious but 
nevertheless commands reasonably widespread agreement: under the circumstances 
described it is generally agreed that being female is a legitimate reaction qualification for 
the job. But even amongst those who agree with this verdict, there may be considerable 
disagreement over the reasons for it. Any adequate theory of reaction qualifications 
should be capable of illuminating these reasons. 
 With respect to a person’s appearance, however, we are often much less confident 
of our intuitions about when it is a legitimate reaction qualification, and those who share 
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the same intuitions are likely to disagree even more markedly on their reasons. Consider 
the following, which I shall call key cases. With one exception, they concern aspects of 
appearance: 
Good Looks. Customers find it pleasurable to be served by good-looking sales 
assistants and respond more favourably to them, sometimes by making purchases 
that they would not otherwise do. In consequence, retailers treat good looks as a 
qualification for being a sales assistant.  
Dress Code. The customers in a cafe prefer to be served by attractive female 
waiters wearing short skirts and low-cut tops. They derive sexual enjoyment from 
looking at them and this is the main reason why they frequent the cafe. It is part of 
the hiring policy of the cafe that the women they employ must be attractive and 
willing to dress in this way. 
Smell. A man has a body odour that others find repellent but he is unwilling to wear 
a deodorant that would eliminate or mask the smell. As a result it is hard for him to 
find employment because he is regarded as bad for business. 
Facial Deformity.  A lawyer has a facial deformity that leads those who look at him 
to recoil. As a result, clients would prefer not to be represented by him, judges 
would prefer him not to work in their courts, and members of the public would 
prefer not to serve on juries when he is representing a client. Law firms are 
reluctant to hire him as a result. 
Tattoo. A man has a small but prominent facial tattoo. He values body art and 
thinks that his tattoo is an important form of self-expression. Some people have an 
instinctual negative reaction to it, however. Employers in a number of fields are 
unwilling to hire him as a result of the disapproval his tattoo elicits.  
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Hijab. The clients of an agency prefer not to be served by Muslim women wearing 
headscarves. It is not because they have anything against Islam, but they do not like 
overt displays of religious commitment in public. As a result the agency will not 
hire women who wear the hijab. 
What I propose to do in the remainder of the article is develop and defend a general 
account of what distinguishes illegitimate from legitimate reaction qualifications that 
makes sense of our verdicts in the core cases described initially and that also illuminates 
the key cases that mainly concern aspects of appearance. I shall begin by considering a 
number of accounts that in my view at best capture a partial truth.  
 
II. Objectionable Beliefs and Behaviour 
 
Broadly speaking, we can distinguish two different ways of approaching the issue of how 
we should distinguish illegitimate from legitimate reaction qualifications.6 According to 
the first approach, a reaction qualification is illegitimate when it is rooted in a particular 
kind of morally objectionable belief or behaviour. According to the second approach, a 
reaction qualification is illegitimate when counting it would unfairly disadvantage those 
who lack it in the competition for advantaged social positions. These different approaches 
are not necessarily mutually exclusive—it may be that we think there is a weighty moral 
reason not to count a reaction qualification grounded in a particular kind of morally 
                                                 
6Some of the accounts I describe have not explicitly been advocated. The issue of reaction qualifications is 
somewhat underexplored. In his seminal contribution, Wertheimer identified a range of factors that 
may affect the legitimacy of a reaction qualification but was sceptical about the possibility of a 
systematic theory: see his ‘Jobs, qualifications, and preference’. I discussed the issue briefly in my 
Levelling the Playing Field (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 32–5. See also D. Miller, 
Principles of Social Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 169–70; S. 
Segall, Equality of Opportunity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 100–3.  Kasper 
Lippert-Rasmussen has the best-developed theory: see his Born Free and Equal? A Philosophical 
Inquiry into the Nature of Discrimination (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), ch. 9. 
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objectionable behaviour because we believe that to do so would unfairly disadvantage 
some of the candidates in the selection process—but they can nevertheless generate 
analytically distinct accounts.7 
 I begin by exploring an account that illustrates the first approach. According to it, 
a reaction qualification is illegitimate if and only if it is rooted in recipients’ morally 
culpable failure to attribute equal moral status to a group, that is, recipients’ failure to 
accept that the members of a group possess a characteristic that requires us to treat them 
as moral equals, where the recipients are morally at fault in some way for that failure. In 
Stephen Darwall’s terms, the recipients do not give members of the group the recognition 
respect to which they are entitled and are morally culpable for their failure to do so.8 A 
recipient may be at fault for a number of different reasons. For example, he might 
wilfully ignore the evidence that members of this group possess the relevant 
characteristic, or he might have internalised a stereotype which implicitly denies that 
members of the group have that characteristic even though he has ample resources and 
opportunity to question the stereotype. To illustrate, consider a variant of Prejudiced 
Customers in which the customers object to being served by a sales assistant because she 
is a member of a particular ethnic group that they regard with blind contempt, despite 
widespread well-reasoned condemnation of racist attitudes of this kind. According to the 
view under consideration, the customers’ attitudes and behaviour involve a morally 
culpable refusal to regard members of this group as having equal moral status. There is a 
powerful moral reason not to count a reaction qualification grounded in their disrespectful 
attitudes and behaviour, even though there may be sound business reasons for the 
                                                 
7Unsurprisingly, the various ways of distinguishing illegitimate reaction qualifications that I explore mirror 
different accounts of what makes discrimination wrong, when it is wrong. For recent accounts of the 
latter, see B. Eidelson, Discrimination and Disrespect (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); 
Hellman, When Is Discrimination Wrong?; Lippert-Rasmussen, Born Free and Equal? See also L. 
Alexander, ‘What makes wrongful discrimination wrong? Biases, preferences, stereotypes, and 
proxies’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 141 (1992), 149–219. 
8S. Darwall, ‘Two kinds of respect’, Ethics, 88 (1977), 36–49. 
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employer to want to do so. Even if the employer does not share or endorse these attitudes 
or behaviour, counting a reaction qualification grounded in them would be to condone 
them. 
This account plausibly identifies a sufficient condition of what makes a reaction 
qualification illegitimate. But it is not clear that it correctly identifies a necessary 
condition. There may be reaction qualifications that are illegitimate even though they are 
not rooted in a culpable failure to regard members of another group as having the same 
fundamental moral status. Consider a rather different case from Prejudiced Customers, 
which I shall refer to as Segregated Customers. It is inspired in part by Deborah 
Hellman’s innovative discussion of what is wrong with discrimination when it is morally 
objectionable.9 Suppose that the customers in a shop prefer to be served by members of 
their own ethnic group. It is not that they culpably refuse to regard other ethnic groups as 
having the same moral status. It is merely because they feel uncomfortable or anxious 
being served by members of these groups since they do not encounter many in their daily 
lives, largely as a result of segregation in neighbourhoods, schools, and workplaces that is 
now sustained by patterns of uncoerced choice. Suppose, however, that these other 
groups have been subject to a history of unjust treatment that partly explains how the 
segregation came about in the first place. This may give the preference of the customers 
to be served by members of their own particular ethnic group an objectionable meaning in 
that context, one that is independent of the intentions of the customers. To the extent that 
it is revealed, their preference may demean these other groups, that is, their preference 
may signal to others that they believe that members of these groups are morally inferior 
even though this is not their belief and it is not their intention to send that message. In 
light of this example, it is plausible to hold that a reaction qualification is illegitimate if it 
                                                 
9See Hellman, When Is Discrimination Wrong?  
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is rooted in a response or form of behaviour that demeans others, even if those who 
respond or behave in this way have no intention of doing so.  There is a powerful moral 
reason not to count reaction qualifications of this kind because counting them would 
involve giving weight to the recipients’ demeaning responses or behaviour, which would 
be to condone the objectionable meaning conveyed by these responses or behaviour. 
Do these two accounts, when combined, correctly identify necessary and 
sufficient conditions for a reaction qualification to be illegitimate? Consider a case that I 
shall call Minimum Height. Suppose that a police force has a minimum height rule for 
police officers simply because most members of the public feel safer with tall police 
officers. But let us assume that there is very good evidence that is widely circulated that 
height makes no difference to the protection that a well-trained police officer can provide. 
Let us also assume that the preference for tall police officers does not rest upon any 
culpable refusal to attribute equal moral status to short people. Furthermore, there has 
been no systematic discrimination in the past against short people, and no history of 
degrading behaviour towards them, so the preference for tall police officers does not 
express a view about the inferior moral status of short people that would demean them. 
There seems to be a strong case for thinking that height is nevertheless an illegitimate 
reaction qualification under these circumstances, even though members of the public 
would feel safer with taller police officers and for this reason might be more inclined to 
go out late at night or venture into areas they would otherwise regard as dangerous. What 
then makes it illegitimate? The best explanation seems to be this: even though ‘making 
the public feel safer’ may be a genuine qualification for the job of police officer, when 
the evidence that height makes no difference to the protection provided by a police officer 
is well-established and widely circulated, then counting a reaction qualification rooted in 
a preference for tall police officers would unfairly disadvantage short people. Short 
 10 
people would in effect be unfairly excluded from occupying the position of police officer 
as a result of unjustified or irrational beliefs, and would thereby unfairly be prevented 
from acquiring the internal goods associated with the role and the external rewards, such 
as income, that it provides. Minimum Height seems to suggest that a person can be 
unfairly disadvantaged by giving weight to a reaction qualification even when it isn’t 
rooted in a culpable failure or refusal to attribute to him or her the same moral status as 
members of other groups, and even when it isn’t rooted in a response or form of 
behaviour that is demeaning. 
 
III. Unfair Disadvantage 
 
Minimum Height gives us reason to explore the second approach to identifying 
illegitimate reaction qualifications, which involves regarding a reaction qualification as 
illegitimate if giving weight to it would unfairly disadvantage those who lack it in the 
competition for advantaged social positions. Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen offers the most 
sophisticated version of it.10 He maintains that ‘a reaction qualification counts from the 
point of view of merit, that is, makes a difference to who is best qualified in the relevant 
sense, if, and only if, it is not rooted in non-individualized, antimeritocratic attitudes’. He 
adds that ‘[a]n attitude is antimeritocratic in a nonindividualized way if, and only if, (a) 
its object is a group of people, and (b) it is such that if a selector decides between 
candidates influenced by it, the decision is not based solely on merit’.11 According to his 
theory, when reaction qualifications are counted that are rooted in non-individualised, 
                                                 
10See Lippert-Rasmussen, Born Free and Equal?, ch. 9. See ibid., p. 256, for his endorsement of this 
general approach to reaction qualifications. 
11Lippert-Rasmussen, Born Free and Equal?, pp. 245–6. 
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antimeritocratic attitudes, there is a strong prima facie reason for thinking that this 
unfairly disadvantages those who lack these qualifications, and therefore for regarding 
these qualifications as illegitimate. In contrast, when a reaction qualification is not rooted 
in such attitudes, there is no reason to think that any unfair disadvantage is created by 
counting it and therefore it should be regarded as legitimate. 
 Lippert-Rasmussen’s account provides an initially plausible explanation of why 
we should think the reaction qualification involved in Prejudiced Customers is 
illegitimate. The preference not to be served by members of a particular ethnic group is 
rooted in negative attitudes towards that group, and towards individuals as members of 
that group, but considered independently of these attitudes, membership of the group has 
nothing to do with how well a person is able to perform the tasks that the position 
involves. According to Lippert-Rasmussen’s account, giving weight to a reaction 
qualification grounded in this preference would therefore unfairly disadvantage members 
of the group. His account also seems to give a plausible verdict in relation to Minimum 
Height. On the assumption that members of the public have a nonindividualised 
antimeritocratic attitude towards the group of short people, because, say, they hold the 
biased view that short people are weaker and hence less able to provide protection, then 
on his account there is reason to think that giving weight to a reaction qualification rooted 
in this attitude would unfairly disadvantage short people and therefore the qualification is 
illegitimate.  
In order to assess Lippert-Rasmussen’s account, we need to probe further what it 
means to say that an attitude is nonindividualised. His idea is that an attitude is 
nonindividualised if its object is a group of people. But is it possible to respond 
negatively or positively to all possessors of a certain characteristic without having a 
nonindividualised attitude to them? Lippert-Rasmussen seems to think so. For example, 
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he allows that a person may respond positively to all those who are charming without 
having a nonindividualised attitude towards them.12 But consider a version of Segregated 
Customers in which the customers respond negatively to sales assistants who are 
members of a particular ethnic group merely because of the colour of their skin, but 
without holding any beliefs about that group or any other general attitude towards it. 
They simply feel awkward or uncomfortable in the company of members of this group in 
a non-reflective way because they have not come into direct contact with many of them 
before. The attitude that underlies the customers’ responses seems to be individualised in 
the relevant sense since its object is not a group of people and it is not a product of any 
beliefs about that group.  
This might seem bizarre: how could a reaction to the colour of a person’s skin be 
anything other than nonindividualised? But a negative attitude or response to the colour 
of a person’s skin may be no different in the relevant respects from a positive attitude or 
response to those who possess a characteristic, such as charm, which Lippert-Rasmussen 
allows may be an individualised attitude. Just as a person may respond positively to 
another’s charm without any mediating beliefs or other attitudes concerning charming 
people in general, so too a person may respond negatively to a person’s skin colour 
without any mediating beliefs or other attitudes concerning the race or ethnic group to 
which he or she belongs. In the variant of Segregated Customers under consideration, the 
colour of a person’s skin simply provokes a negative reaction, in much the same way that 
charm may provoke a positive reaction. Even if the psychological explanation for this 
negative reaction makes reference to the experience of belonging to a different ethnic 
group, in particular to the way in which that group has been segregated from others, the 
reaction is not rooted in nonindividualised attitudes in the relevant sense. So it would 
                                                 
12Cf. ibid., pp. 247–8. 
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seem that Lippert-Rasmussen’s account is implausibly committed to the view that giving 
weight to reaction qualifications rooted in people’s negative responses to members of an 
ethnic group sharing a particular skin colour—when those people do not hold any beliefs 
about that group as a whole or possess any other attitudes towards it—does not unfairly 
disadvantage members of this group, and that these qualifications are therefore legitimate. 
Could he avoid this problem by shifting his ground to the view that whenever a 
person responds negatively or positively to all possessors of a certain characteristic, 
whether charm or skin colour, they must have a nonindividualised attitude towards them? 
According to his account, it would then follow that we have reason to regard reaction 
qualifications rooted in such responses as illegitimate if that characteristic has nothing to 
do with how well the person is able to perform the tasks involved in a job when 
considered independently of these responses. But it would be hard for him to shift his 
ground in this way without his account generating implausible conclusions. For example, 
it would then seem to imply that in Normal Customers we have reason to think that 
counting politeness as a reaction qualification would unfairly disadvantage the impolite 
and that it is therefore an illegitimate reaction qualification.  
 
IV. A Hybrid Theory and its Application to the Core Cases 
Each of the accounts I have considered has strengths but also faces problems. Rather than 
abandoning them completely, I propose instead a hybrid theory that incorporates aspects 
of each, together with an additional element:  
                   A reaction qualification is illegitimate if and only if: 
(1) it is grounded in recipients’ morally culpable failure to attribute equal 
moral status to some of the potential applicants, or 
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(2) it is grounded in preferences, feelings, or responses of recipients that 
express an objectionable meaning, even though recipients do not culpably fail 
to attribute equal moral status to any of the potential applicants, or  
(3) counting it would unfairly disadvantage some potential applicants in the 
selection process by giving insufficient weight to their interests, or  
(4) counting it would on balance exacerbate existing unfair disadvantages, or 
would contribute to or cause rights violations.  
Conditions (1)–(2), and the main case for them, have in effect already been presented in 
section II. In this section and the next I shall focus mainly on (3) whilst also giving some 
indication of how (4), the new element, is to be interpreted.  
 Some will object to the hybrid theory I am proposing on the grounds that one or 
more if its elements are unnecessary. For example, some will hold that conditions (1) and 
(2) identify features that are merely ‘epiphenomenal’ and that reaction qualifications 
rooted in a culpable failure to attribute equal moral status or in demeaning behaviour are 
illegitimate only because, and in so far as, counting them as qualifications would unfairly 
disadvantage those who lack them in the relevant competitions for advantaged social 
positions.13 In defence of this position it might be argued that when a reaction 
qualification is rooted in such behaviour, we may have a moral reason to condemn the 
agents concerned since their behaviour reflects badly on their character, but unless 
counting it would unfairly advantage some applicants, there is no moral reason not to 
give weight to it. But even when no unfair advantage would be created by counting a 
reaction qualification grounded in a culpable failure to accord equal moral status or in 
demeaning behaviour—perhaps because those who would as a result be denied a job 
would receive comparable or better employment elsewhere—there is still a strong moral 
                                                 
13Cf. ibid., pp. 136–7.   
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reason not to count it because doing so would involve giving weight to disrespectful 
attitudes or to behaviour that has an objectionable meaning, which would be to condone 
those attitudes or the meanings conveyed by the behaviour.14 
 Others might argue that only (1) and/or (2) are necessary. But I think my analysis 
of Minimum Height gives reason for incorporating some version of (3): it is needed in 
order to make full sense of how potential applicants for jobs can be unfairly 
disadvantaged in the competition for them as a result of the prejudices of others. 
Accordingly, my interpretation of (3) gives a central role to the idea of prejudice.15 But I 
shall extend the idea of prejudice beyond its normal reach, and develop (3) in a way that 
gives weight, firstly, to the control that an applicant has over the features that provoke 
responses in recipients, secondly, to the character of these responses and the control that 
recipients have over them, and thirdly, to whether these features are integral to the 
applicant’s conception of the good.  
 Before presenting my interpretation of (3), let me explain what I mean by 
‘prejudice’. I shall use the term in a way that allows not only beliefs but also preferences, 
feelings, and responses to be prejudices. A person’s belief about those with a particular 
characteristic, or about members of a particular group, counts as a prejudice when she 
lacks adequate justification for it, whereas a person’s preference, feeling, or response in 
relation to those with a particular characteristic, or in relation to members of a particular 
group, counts as a prejudice when she has no reasons for it, even though it may be 
                                                 
14For a persuasive argument that there can be cases of harmless but wrongful discrimination in which no 
one is disadvantaged. See A. Slavny and T. Parr, ‘Harmless discrimination’, Legal Theory, 
forthcoming. A number of accounts of what makes discrimination wrong (when it is wrong) seem to 
imply that there can be cases of discrimination that are wrongful despite no one being unfairly 
disadvantaged. See Alexander, ‘What makes wrongful discrimination wrong?; Eidelson, 
Discrimination and Disrespect; Hellman, When is Discrimination Wrong? In some of these cases, 
however, it might seem inapt to say that the discrimination is unjust even though it is wrongful. See 
A. Mason, ‘Justice, respect, and treating people as equals’, Social Equality, ed. C. Fourie, Fabian 
Schuppert, and I. Wallimann-Helmer (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 129–45. 
15See also Mason, Levelling the Playing Field, pp. 32–5. My article is in part a response to the challenges 
that Lippert-Rasmussen poses for the incomplete theory of reaction qualifications that I presented in 
that book (see Born Free and Equal?, pp. 243–5). 
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possible to explain why she has it. A person lacks adequate justification for her belief if 
and only if it is inadequately supported by the evidence or not adequately grounded in it, 
or she accepts it as a result of logical errors. Taken together, these claims are intended as 
a stipulative definition of a prejudice. The appropriate test of it is not whether it accords 
with ordinary usage, but whether it can play a plausible role in explaining when a reaction 
qualification unfairly disadvantages some candidates in the selection process.  
 In addressing the issue of whether counting a reaction qualification would unfairly 
disadvantage some potential applicants, my theory aims to balance fairly the interests of 
employers, potential applicants, and recipients, and in doing so to respect their agency by 
giving due weight to their reasons for action. It first asks whether the recipients have 
adequate justification for any beliefs about potential applicants on which the reaction 
qualification is grounded. If they do not, then I claim that counting the reaction 
qualification would unfairly disadvantage some potential applicants. If the recipients do 
not possess any reasons for the preferences, feelings or responses on which the reaction 
qualification is grounded, then my theory maintains that there is a prima facie case for 
regarding that qualification as unfairly disadvantaging some potential applicants. Even 
though a qualification grounded in this way should be given some weight, it does not 
reflect or express the rational agency of the recipients, so it should be given less weight 
than the interests of the potential applicants in being selected for jobs for which they 
would otherwise be well-qualified. There are cases, however, in which giving weight to a 
reaction qualification that is grounded in preferences, feelings, or responses that the 
recipients do not possess any reasons for having is necessary in order to be fair to them, 
either because of choices made by the potential applicants or because these feelings or 
responses impair the recipients’ agency. These exceptions are captured in my elaboration 
of (3) below: 
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Counting a reaction qualification would unfairly disadvantage a potential 
applicant if and only if it is rooted (wholly or in part) in a prejudice, with the 
following exceptions. No unfair disadvantage would be created by counting a 
reaction qualification that is grounded in preferences, feelings, or responses 
that recipients do not possess any reasons for having when either 
(a) the potential applicant who lacks that qualification made choices that 
foreseeably resulted in her not acquiring or retaining it even though the 
cost or difficulty of doing so would not have been unreasonably large 
compared to that, if any, which was faced by other applicants, and 
acquiring or retaining that qualification would not have required her to act 
contrary to some reasonable moral doctrine or conception of the good that 
she holds, or  
(b) the potential applicant could choose to acquire that qualification by 
changing aspects of herself or her appearance where the cost or difficulty 
of doing so would not be unreasonably large compared to that, if any, 
faced by other applicants, and a commitment to these aspects is not a 
product of some reasonable moral doctrine or conception of the good she 
holds,16 or  
(c) the recipients are unable to control the relevant feeling or response, or 
it would be costly or difficult for them to change it, and it is debilitating to 
them.  
I shall now apply my overall theory to the three core cases I identified at the beginning of 
the article, and also to Minimum Height and Segregated Customers, which have emerged 
as important test cases. In doing so, I aim to make plausible the idea that prejudice in my 
                                                 
16For the purposes of clauses (a) and (b), I understand a reasonable moral doctrine or conception of the 
good to be one that is consistent with a belief in the fundamental equality of persons, that need not 
involve any logical errors, and that can be made compatible with the evidence. 
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extended sense is central to an adequate account of what distinguishes illegitimate from 
legitimate reaction qualifications by showing that the role I give to it within my overall 
theory enables us to provide a credible explanation and justification of our verdicts in 
relation to these cases.  
Normal Customers is a relatively straightforward case for the theory, at least if we 
assume that the preference of customers for sales assistants who are polite is grounded in 
a social norm that they endorse governing what it is for the parties in market transactions 
to show respect for others as equals. If that is the basis of their preference, a reaction 
qualification rooted in it would not fall foul of any of conditions (1)–(4). 
My theory also gives us a plausible analysis of Minimum Height. The preference 
for tall police officers counts as a prejudice because it is based on a belief about the 
superior protection they provide that is inconsistent with the available evidence. 
According to condition (3), reaction qualifications grounded in this preference would 
therefore be illegitimate.  
The account I am proposing illuminates different versions of Prejudiced 
Customers. Suppose a customer prefers not to be served by members of a particular 
ethnic group because he believes they are less trustworthy or honest, whilst the publicly 
available evidence supports the conclusion that dishonesty or untrustworthiness is no 
more prevalent in that minority than it is in his own group, even if he is not acquainted 
with that evidence, misinterprets it, or ignores it. In that case, a reaction qualification 
rooted in a preference of this kind would be illegitimate according to condition (3) 
because it would involve a prejudiced belief, and counting it would unfairly disadvantage 
members of this group in the selection process. What if the available evidence were to 
support a generalisation about the members of a particular group, for example, that they 
are on average less trustworthy? Even under these circumstances, the customer’s belief 
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would still be based on a prejudice if it was not adequately grounded in that evidence but 
rather in some stereotype in which he has an affective investment, or if there is evidence 
that the selection procedure for the relevant position reliably distinguishes between those 
members of the group who are trustworthy and those who are not.17  
According to my stipulative definition, a recipient’s preference, feeling, or 
response also counts as a prejudice if she does not possess any reasons for it. In virtue of 
employing this extended sense of prejudice, my account has implications for Segregated 
Customers that make sense of our worries about it. In this case customers are 
uncomfortable interacting with sales assistants from a particular ethnic group, but their 
discomfort is not rooted in a negative stereotype or any general negative beliefs about that 
ethnic group or members of it, and nor do they possess any reasons for these feelings of 
discomfort, though their feelings are explicable by reference to their experience of 
segregation. According to the interpretation of condition (3) I am proposing, a reaction 
qualification grounded in such feelings would be illegitimate: the exceptions clauses 
involved in (a)–(c) do not apply, and so counting it would unfairly disadvantage some of 
the applicants. This matches and explains the intuitions that I think are shared by many in 
relation to this case and others that are relevantly similar.  
Note that the reaction qualification at stake in versions of both Prejudiced 
Customers and Segregated Customers may also be illegitimate for other reasons. In 
Prejudiced Customers, the belief about the dishonesty or untrustworthiness of members 
of the ethnic group may have its origins in a culpable failure to accept their equal moral 
status—see condition (1). In Segregated Customers, the responses in which the reaction 
qualification is grounded may express an objectionable meaning, even though there is no 
culpable failure or refusal to attribute equal status to members of the ethnic group—see 
                                                 
17Indeed it is plausible to think that selectors are under a duty to devise and implement such procedures in 
order to treat applicants from this group with respect. 
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condition (2). In both cases counting it might on balance exacerbate existing unfair 
disadvantages—see condition (4). If more than one of these conditions applies, then the 
illegitimacy of this reaction qualification would be overdetermined.  
This might make one worry that my account does not need to incorporate the 
extended sense of prejudice, and that a narrower sense would be sufficient for the purpose 
of explaining when counting a reaction qualification would create unfair disadvantage in 
the selection process. But even if the extended sense of prejudice doesn’t in practice 
capture any illegitimate reaction qualifications that would not be identified by conditions 
(1), (2), and (4), together with (3) interpreted in terms of the narrower sense of prejudice, 
my claim is that it nevertheless plays a role in any full explanation of when counting a 
reaction qualification would create unfair disadvantage, and highlights an additional 
reason for regarding some reaction qualifications as illegitimate that may be significant 
when it comes to making all things considered judgements about whether we are justified 
in counting a reaction qualification.  
That is not the only role this extended sense of prejudice can play, however. 
Although my argument here is contentious, it seems to me that only by extending the 
notion in this way, can we make sense of one particular case in which unfair disadvantage 
could be created. We can imagine a variant of Segregated Customers in which not only is 
there no culpable failure to attribute equal moral status to the members of the other ethnic 
group, but also no objectionable meaning is expressed by the customers’ responses, and 
the group has not been subject to any unfair disadvantage in the past. The segregation that 
exists, and the feelings of discomfort that arise from it, are created and sustained purely 
by individual choices about where to live, work, and spend their leisure time. Yet it seems 
to me that even in this case counting ‘being a member of the same ethnic community’ as 
a reaction qualification would be morally problematic because it would unfairly 
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disadvantage applicants from the other group who want to take advantage of the 
opportunities for work in that community, perhaps because of the greater range or quality 
of those opportunities. 
Consider the other core case that I am regarding as a test of a successful theory of 
reaction qualifications, namely, Women Patients. The preference that these women 
patients have for being examined by a woman doctor need not involve any prejudice in 
the relevant sense against male doctors or in favour of female doctors. Their preference 
may be rooted in reasonable religious doctrines that prohibit being unclothed in front of 
those who are not close family members, or in social norms governing intimate contact, 
or in justified concerns about unwanted male attention or objectification in a society 
where that is common. Furthermore, women patients’ preferences to be treated by women 
doctors need not be demeaning to men (or indeed women) or involve a culpable failure to 
accept men’s fundamental moral equality, and counting a reaction qualification grounded 
in them would not on balance exacerbate existing unfair disadvantages. So a reaction 
qualification of this kind can be legitimate according to my account, which again makes 
good sense of a widely shared judgement. Although my account implies that reaction 
qualifications grounded in women patients’ preferences for a female doctor are in 
principle legitimate, how much weight they should be given in practice will depend in 
part on the preferences of male patients (for example, whether they are indifferent 
between being examined by male or female doctors), the gender balance of the patients, 
and the gender balance of existing doctors within a surgery. 
 
V. Application of the Theory to the Key Cases Involving Appearance 
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The account I am proposing casts light on the core cases. Let me now consider its 
application to the key cases involving appearance that I described earlier.  
It has plausible implications for Good Looks. In the case as it is described 
customers do not have any general beliefs about good-looking people that are 
unsupported by the evidence, but they happen to derive more pleasure from interacting 
with good-looking sales assistants. Their preferences for being served by a good-looking 
sales assistant, and the pleasure they receive from interacting with him or her, are rooted 
in feelings that they do not possess any reasons for having. Reaction qualifications 
grounded in them are therefore illegitimate according to condition (3) unless one or more 
of the exceptions clauses applies.  
 Does (a) or (b) apply? These clauses permit reaction qualifications to be grounded 
in recipients’ preferences, feelings, or responses towards a candidate, even when they do 
not have any reasons for them, in some cases when she has or had control over her 
appearance. Most people have some degree of control over their looks: perhaps they can 
improve them by reducing their weight, taking more trouble over how they dress, using 
cosmetics, or at the extreme, by surgery. But there are limits to these improvements and 
they are often costly or difficult to make.18 When we take into account these facts, it is 
unlikely that reaction qualifications grounded in a customer’s preference for being served 
by good-looking assistants for which she has no reasons will fall under exceptions clause 
(a) or (b). Note, however, that variants of Good Looks are possible for which my theory 
would have different implications. Suppose that customers or clients subscribe to a 
consumerist conception of the good that attaches value to the experience of shopping in 
high status stores and being served by glamorous and attractive assistants. In that case 
they would have reasons for their preference for being served by good-looking glamorous 
                                                 
18For some evidence about the limits of the improvements we can make, see Hamermesh, Beauty Pays, pp. 
32–5. 
 23 
employees, so it would not count as a prejudice, and a qualification grounded in it would 
not violate condition (3). I discuss the issue of whether this is an unappealing feature of 
my account below. 
 There may also be reasons for thinking that counting reaction qualifications 
rooted in customers’ preferences for the good-looking would exacerbate existing unfair 
disadvantages, in which case these qualifications would be illegitimate according to 
condition (4). Suppose, for example, that those who lack good looks suffer from a general 
bias against them simply because interviewers favour attractive candidates or are 
influenced by stereotypes concerning the attractive or unattractive, for example, the 
stereotype that overweight individuals are lazy.19 Furthermore, to the extent that who 
counts as good-looking is determined in part by gender-specific norms that place greater 
burdens on women than men, or by racially-biased standards that it is tougher for some 
racial groups to meet, then selecting on the basis of looks will tend to exacerbate these 
existing unfair disadvantages. 
 My account is also capable of explaining why we might justifiably think that 
counting a reaction qualification that is grounded in the displeasure that customers 
experience as a result of being served by a member of another ethnic group would in 
many cases involve a greater injustice compared to counting a reaction qualification that 
is grounded in the mere pleasure that customers experience from being served by an 
attractive sales assistant. When the preferences involved in the former are tainted by their 
origins in racist practices, then they are likely to be demeaning, whereas the preferences 
involved in the latter may not demean either the attractive or the unattractive, and indeed 
may be wholly unobjectionable. In the case of demeaning preferences, we might suppose 
                                                 
19See Rhode, The Beauty Bias, pp. 94–5. Rhode also cites empirical evidence that ‘[a]ppearance … skews 
judgements about competence and job performance … Resumes get a more favourable assessment 
when they are thought to belong to more attractive individuals’ (ibid., p. 27). 
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that customers are under a duty not to give expression to them.20 But when a preference 
to be served by a good-looking sales assistant does not demean those who lack good 
looks, and is not objectionable on other grounds, customers with such a preference are not 
under a duty to refrain from expressing it, even when this preference constitutes a 
prejudice in my sense and cannot ground a legitimate reaction qualification.  
 In Dress Code, arguably the preference of male customers to be served by 
attractive women in short skirts and low-cut tops is demeaning because of the way in 
which it objectifies women. As a result, a dress code grounded in that preference would 
be illegitimate according to condition (2). It would also potentially be illegitimate 
according to condition (4) when we take into consideration the role that this dress code 
would play in promoting stereotypes that reinforce gender disadvantage. The account I 
am proposing could nevertheless permit some gender-differentiated dress codes. For 
example, it could permit one that is grounded in preferences for which the recipients have 
no reasons provided it meets the following criteria: it is not demeaning; it is not 
unreasonably costly or difficult for one sex to comply with compared to the other; it does 
not impose requirements on potential employees adherence to which would be 
inconsistent with norms that are integral to reasonable conceptions of the good that they 
hold; and it does not reinforce gender disadvantage. So, for example, a gender-
differentiated appearance code grounded in this way that requires men but not women to 
wear a shirt and tie may be justified, but not a code that requires men to wear trousers and 
women skirts, since this goes against some reasonable religious conceptions of the 
good—so will not be permitted by clause (b)—and arguably it falls foul of (4) by 
reinforcing unfair gender-specific norms governing appearance. 
                                                 
20See Lippert-Rasmussen, Born Free and Equal?, pp. 250–1. 
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Let me now move on to the key cases involving reaction qualifications that bring 
to the fore the relevance of the choice and control that candidates may have over their 
appearance or personal characteristics and the control that recipients may have over their 
responses to them. Consider Smell. It would surely be permissible to regard the person’s 
body odour as disqualifying him from a job that required him to deal with co-workers, 
customers or clients, or to insist that he agree to use a deodorant before appointing him to 
it. This is also the conclusion that is reached by applying my account, and the rationale it 
gives for this conclusion is plausible. Even though the responses of customers, clients, or 
co-workers to the odour would be prejudices in the relevant sense because they do not 
possess reasons for them, they can nevertheless ground a legitimate reaction qualification 
because the odour is under his control and it would be relatively costless for him to deal 
with it (unless, perhaps, his skin is highly sensitive to the chemicals in deodorants)—see 
clause (b). My account also implies that even if customers, clients, or co-workers could 
take a harmless pill that would prevent them from smelling the odour when they were 
interacting with him, so that in effect they had control over their reactions, it would still 
be fair to insist that a refusal to wear the deodorant disqualified him from the job. This 
seems independently plausible as well.  
 Suppose instead that the body odour is impossible to eliminate or mask. Would a 
reaction qualification rooted in responses to it then be illegitimate? My account implies 
that this comes down in part to how much control those who come into contact with it 
have over their feelings and responses, and the effects of the odour on them. If the body 
odour is overpowering to the point that it is debilitating to those who encounter it, and 
they feel nauseous in a way that they cannot control, then we should surely allow that a 
reaction qualification grounded in it may be legitimate, and this is what clause (c) 
implies. In reply it might be said that to do so would unfairly disadvantage the person 
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afflicted with the odour. But the interests of this unfortunate individual need to be 
balanced against those of the employer and the recipients, and in the case under 
consideration these two sets of interests surely have more weight—and indeed this is 
what is implied by (c). This case also illustrates how the mere fact that a person’s 
interests would be setback through no fault of his own by counting a reaction 
qualification is not sufficient on its own to show that we have a weighty moral reason not 
to count it and that it is therefore illegitimate. There is a weighty moral reason not to 
count a reaction qualification when a person’s interests would be setback by doing so 
only if fairness to others does not require us to count it. 
 Consider Facial Deformity. Let us assume that the lawyer with the deformity was 
born with it and he cannot improve his appearance. Clients, judges, and jury members do 
not possess reasons for their responses to him—they may even have reasons for not 
wanting to have these responses—but they cannot help being repelled by his facial 
deformity, no matter how hard they try. In that case, their responses to him fall into the 
category of a prejudice that it is impossible for them to control and that is debilitating to 
them, so clause (c) again would mean that condition (3) would not imply that a reaction 
qualification grounded in it was illegitimate. But when their response to his deformity can 
be educated, without great cost or difficulty, it would not be covered by that exceptions 
clause, so a reaction qualification grounded in it would be illegitimate. There may be 
other reasons why, according to my account, such a reaction qualification would be 
illegitimate that apply even in cases when recipients have no control over their response: 
their response is potentially demeaning—see condition (2)—and arguably counting a 
reaction qualification grounded in it would exacerbate the unfair disadvantages 
experienced by those with such deformities, for example, the disadvantages that result 
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from stigmatisation and reduced access to a range of goods, including those involved in 
friendships and relationships—see condition (4).  
 Now consider Tattoo, which is similar in one respect to Smell and Facial 
Deformity: the recipients do not possess reasons for their response to it, though in this 
case their response is not debilitating to them. Unlike Facial Deformity, however, and 
more like Smell, the person concerned had control over the feature that threatens to 
disadvantage him. But even though he chose to have the facial tattoo, he did so in 
accordance with a reasonable conception of the good that regards body art as an 
important mode of self-expression. As a result, exceptions clause (a) would not apply, 
and the responses of the recipients are not debilitating in a way that would trigger 
exceptions clause (c), so my account implies that a reaction qualification grounded in 
them would be illegitimate. We can, however, describe a variant of Tattoo that, according 
to my account, would permit a legitimate reaction qualification to be grounded in 
recipients’ responses. Suppose that the recipients don’t have an instinctual negative 
reaction to the tattoo but instead disapprove of it because they think it involves a kind of 
disrespect to one’s body, perhaps for religious reasons. In that case, their reactions would 
no longer count as prejudices, so they can ground a legitimate reaction qualification.  
 Could it plausibly be replied that people’s conceptions of the good should be 
treated simply as a matter of choice for the purpose of balancing the interests of 
employers, candidates, and recipients and for determining what counts as unfair 
disadvantage? Might it be argued that one of the costs of such a choice, for example, the 
choice to have a facial tattoo, is the reactions provoked in others, and because it is fair to 
require people to bear the costs of their choices, it is fair to count qualifications rooted in 
such reactions when selecting for jobs and other advantaged social positions? The idea 
that it is fair to require a person to bear the costs of her choices is at its most plausible 
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when we have in mind the cost of the resources that she consumes in the course of 
pursuing her conception of the good. But the response a person provokes in recipients is 
not a cost in that sense, and it is far from clear that it is fair to require her to suffer the 
consequences of being excluded from jobs as a result of selectors giving weight to 
recipients’ responses when they have no reasons for their responses and she would have 
to act contrary to her conception of the good in order to avoid being excluded from these 
jobs. Nevertheless, it might be thought that when people aim to provoke a negative 
response in others, and this is part of the point of the appearance they have adopted (for 
example, a disturbing full-face tattoo), then the fair balance of interests shifts, and it is 
permissible for reaction qualifications to be grounded in this negative response, even if it 
would not be costly or difficult for recipients to change it. This suggests that my account 
may require a minor modification to accommodate this judgement. 
 Finally, consider Hijab. The recipients object to the wearing of the hijab on the 
grounds that it is wrong or inappropriate to display overt religious symbols in public, not 
because they are prejudiced against Muslims. Condition (3) does not therefore imply that 
a reaction qualification grounded in this belief would be illegitimate. But condition (4) 
might have that implication if Muslims were already unfairly disadvantaged—which, of 
course, they may be in societies afflicted by Islamophobia. Would grounding a reaction 
qualification in the belief that it is wrong to display overt religious symbols in public also 
threaten freedom of religion? Whether this would make it hard for hijab-wearing Muslim 
women to obtain employment whilst remaining faithful to their religion as they saw it 
would depend on the prevalence of that belief in their society. If it did burden them in a 
way that placed their religious freedom under threat, then this would trigger condition (4).  
This condition would also be triggered if counting a reaction qualification grounded in 
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such a belief would have the effect of reinforcing a culture of religious intoleration that 
involved rights violations. 
Is the sensitivity that my account displays to whether the recipients’ possess 
reasons for having their responses an unappealing feature of it? My account is not 
unmotivated. When we reflect upon Segregated Customers and its variants, it seems clear 
that we should be concerned about how people can be disadvantaged in selection 
processes by recipients’ preferences, feelings, or responses for which they have no 
reasons—and our legitimate concern here does not seem reducible to worries about 
condoning demeaning behaviour or adversely affecting those who have already been 
unfairly disadvantaged. But in cases where recipients possess reasons for their 
responses—reasons that do not fly in the face of relevant evidence or involve logical 
errors—then the disadvantage that some applicants experience as a result of grounding a 
reaction qualification in these responses does not seem unfair, given the interest that the 
recipients have in acting upon their reasons. In effect, when recipients have reasons for 
their preferences and these are not grounded in beliefs that lack adequate justification, we 
ought to give due weight to them, and doing so may permit reaction qualifications 
grounded in them to be legitimate, even though counting them would disadvantage some 
applicants. 
 The way in which my account tracks whether the recipients’ responses are 
grounded in reasons does mean, however, that it could not straightforwardly be encoded 
in anti-discrimination legislation. The practical challenges involved in determining 
whether a preference, feeling, or response counts as a prejudice would be too great. In 
many cases, even when recipients’ reactions converge, they will have different bases. 
Some of these reactions will be based on reasons whilst others are based on prejudices of 
one kind or another. How much weight a selector is justified in giving to a legitimate 
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reaction qualification will depend on the preponderance of reactions that are adequately 
grounded in reasons, which will be hard to discern in practice. Furthermore, the 
sensitivity of my account to whether a candidate’s appearance is part of their commitment 
to a reasonable conception of the good—see clauses (a) and (b)—would create a serious 
moral hazard if it were to be translated as it stands into legislation: applicants could 
pretend that their appearance was an integral part of some reasonable conception of the 
good that they held so as to avoid having to change it to acquire a reaction qualification 
for a job. This does not damage my account, however, for it aims to capture the weighty 
moral reasons we may have for not counting a reaction qualification, and is not intended 
to provide a formula for the legal regulation of hiring practices. The issue of whether 
these reasons should be enforced, or indeed whether they should guide legislation at all, is 
a separate matter. 
 
VI. Counting Illegitimate Reaction Qualifications 
 
I have left open the possibility that in some cases, even though a reaction qualification is 
illegitimate (that is, there is a weighty moral reason not to count it), counting it is 
nevertheless morally justified all things considered. Let me consider four cases which 
illustrate some different reasons why this might be so. I shall call them Prejudiced 
Customers (Business at Risk), Primary School Teacher, Policing Preference, and The 
Ironic Case. 
 Prejudiced Customers (Business at Risk) is a variant of the original case described 
in section I. Like that case, it supposes that the customers of a department store have 
prejudiced beliefs about those from a particular ethnic group, and will shop elsewhere if 
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the store employs members of that group. But it also supposes that the proportion of 
customers that are prejudiced in this way is sufficiently high that the store will go out of 
business if it doesn’t conform to their wishes. The store’s owners are not themselves 
prejudiced, but there is no legislation in place that prohibits counting reaction 
qualifications that are grounded in such prejudices, and they have reason to think that 
their competitors will (continue to) give weight to them when selecting employees. So 
they count these qualifications because they fear, with good reason, they will not 
otherwise be able to survive given market conditions. 
 What should we say about this case? According to my account, reaction 
qualifications grounded in this prejudice would be illegitimate because they would violate 
at least three of the four conditions, namely, (3) and (4) and either (1) or (2). Businesses 
have no survival rights but we might nevertheless think that when an employer’s interests 
would seriously be damaged by not counting a reaction qualification—suppose that 
building up her business has been her life project and she will lose her livelihood—it 
would not merely be understandable but morally justified for her to count it.21 She is not 
morally required to make such a sacrifice—in effect there is a personal prerogative that 
permits her not to do so in these extreme cases—though it is plausible to insist that she is 
under a moral duty to act politically in support of legislation forbidding discrimination of 
this kind, and to employ members of the minority in roles that do not involve contact with 
customers. Where we draw the limits of this personal prerogative is a matter of 
judgement. For example, is it morally justified all things considered for an employer to 
count these illegitimate reaction qualifications if her business would be much less 
successful were she not to count these qualifications, but she could nevertheless earn an 
income from it that was sufficient to meet her needs? The moral reasons for not counting 
                                                 
21See P. Singer, ‘Is racial discrimination arbitrary?’, Philosophia,  8 (1978), 185–203, at p. 189. 
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these reaction qualifications are weighty, so in these cases it is plausible to think that the 
employer is under an all things considered moral obligation not to do so, despite the 
consequences for her. 
 Next, consider the case of Primary School Teacher, in which not counting an 
illegitimate reaction qualification would potentially be unjust in one respect. Suppose that 
primary school children learn better from women teachers.22 They prefer to be taught by 
women and they learn better from them because they have internalised conceptions of 
masculinity and femininity that make them more at ease with women teachers and more 
receptive to them. According to my account, since the children’s preference for a woman 
teacher is a product of a response which they do not possess any reasons for having, a 
reaction qualification grounded in it would be illegitimate, and counting it would be 
unfair to men seeking a career as a primary school teacher. It might nevertheless seem 
that it would be justified, all things considered, to count it. This is at least partly because 
it seems unfair to hold children responsible, in effect, for their preferences and responses 
in a way that damages their interests. Indeed, we might think that in consequence my 
interpretation of condition (3) requires some revision if it is to provide an adequate 
account of how we should balance fairly the interests of recipients, employers, and 
applicants when the recipients are children. But even if when we give due weight to the 
interests of children, it follows that men who want to become primary school teachers are 
not unfairly disadvantaged by counting this reaction qualification, with the consequence 
that there is no violation of condition (3), it would still seem to be the case that counting 
it would tend to reinforce the conceptions of gender that children have internalised 
because they would be exposed to far fewer male primary school teachers. There is 
therefore a case for saying that it violates condition (4) by exacerbating gender 
                                                 
22This case is adapted from Wertheimer, ‘Jobs, qualifications, and preferences’, pp. 107–8.   
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disadvantage. On the other hand, not counting it as a reaction qualification seems to be 
unjust to those children whose interests are damaged because their educational 
development is adversely affected by not having female primary school teachers. For this 
reason it strikes me as a hard case, and how it ought to be resolved will depend in part 
upon contextual considerations and a more nuanced consideration of the evidence. How 
much will some children’s early formal education be setback by being taught by men? 
How likely is it that having predominantly women primary school teachers will reinforce 
conceptions of gender, and to what extent will this exacerbate unfair gender 
disadvantage? 
 Consider now two cases where reaction qualifications are illegitimate according to 
one or more of the criteria, but counting them would nevertheless promote justice, 
beginning with Policing Preference.23 According to this case, those who live in a 
particular neighbourhood prefer to be policed by a member of their own ethnic group. 
They have been unfairly discriminated against and disadvantaged by another group. As a 
result they distrust members of that other group and would cooperate less fully with a 
police officer who came from it. They have come to hold an unjustified belief that 
members of the other group are incapable of acting morally, and as a result they culpably 
refuse to attribute equal moral status to them. According to my account, a reaction 
qualification grounded in such a preference would be illegitimate because it would violate 
condition (1) and probably (3) as well. But we might nevertheless think that under some 
circumstances it would be morally justified to count it all things considered: given the 
history of oppression from which this ethnic group has suffered, their preference is 
condonable, and counting the reaction qualification would be justified all things 
considered if it served to compensate some of those who would then be appointed as 
                                                 
23I owe this example to Shlomi Segall. 
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police officers for the past injustice they have experienced, and at the same time 
challenged the structures of injustice to which the group are subject by providing role 
models and undermining stereotypes.  
 Finally, consider The Ironic Case, discussed by Lippert-Rasmussen, another 
example where counting an illegitimate reaction qualification could promote justice.24 In 
this case black telephone sales assistants are hired because they tend to sound as if they 
are white, as a result of consciously trying to avoid sounding black because they know 
that if they sound black they will sell less goods as a result of racial prejudice. White 
telephone sales assistants do not make the same effort, and as a result they are often 
mistaken for being black, and consequently sell fewer goods. Here a reaction 
qualification grounded in the preference of customers to deal with white telephone sales 
assistants would be illegitimate, potentially for multiple reasons that relate to conditions 
(1)–(3): these preferences may be based on a culpable refusal to attribute equal moral 
status to black people, they are demeaning when expressed even if they do not involve 
such a refusal, and they involve prejudice if they are based on unjustified generalisations 
about the untrustworthiness of black people. Despite these weighty reasons for not 
counting ‘sounding white’ as a qualification, in some circumstances that might 
nevertheless be justified all things considered if it would promote just outcomes to some 
considerable extent, for example, by significantly reducing the unemployment levels of 
black people and compensating a number of them for the injustice they have suffered in 
the past. Furthermore, if white applicants have the very same racial prejudices that make 
black telephone sales assistants more successful, then they cannot credibly voice a 
complaint about being disadvantaged as a result of counting this reaction qualification.  
 
                                                 
24See Lippert-Rasmussen, Born Free and Equal?, p. 254. 
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VII. Concluding remarks 
What role should my account of reaction qualifications play within an overall theory of 
justice? There are a number of possibilities here, but we might think of it in part as giving 
content to an independent principle of justice that governs the allocation of advantaged 
social positions and relevantly similar roles. Such a principle might then be supplemented 
by others, for example, by a sufficientarian or prioritarian principle of justice that is 
designed to mitigate the disadvantages people face through no fault of their own. In order 
to see how this might work, compare two cases in which a person is unable to get a job 
that she desires, say, that of violinist in an orchestra. In the first case, she is prevented 
from doing so because, although she is an excellent musician, she has a facial deformity 
to which concert audiences have a negative response which they do not possess any 
reasons for having—perhaps they even have reasons for not wanting to have it. In the 
second case, she is unable to get the job because, although she is an excellent musician, 
opportunities to become a paid violinist are scarce because only a small minority are 
willing to pay money to listen to classical music. Let us suppose in both cases that the 
musicians, through no fault of their own, possess no other skills and end up badly off as a 
result of their failures in the job market. A theory of justice that contained principles that 
apply specifically to the distribution of advantaged social positions might suppose that 
even though in both cases the musician merits some compensation because she is badly 
off through no fault of her own, their predicaments differ in a morally relevant respect. In 
the first case, unlike the second, the musician suffers from two different injustices. She 
ends up badly off through no fault of her own and she is also unfairly deprived of the 
possibility of being a member of an orchestra as a result of a reaction qualification being 
counted that is grounded in responses of classical music lovers towards her facial 
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deformity that they do not possess any reasons for having—and that are also perhaps 
demeaning to her.  
If this picture is correct, inequalities of access to jobs that arise as a result of 
recipients’ preferences for dealing with individuals with a particular appearance may be 
unjust for non-instrumental reasons. One possible way of explaining the injustices 
involved here would appeal to the idea that in selecting for advantaged social positions, 
firstly, we should give due weight to the equal moral status of persons by not counting 
reaction qualifications that are grounded in a culpable failure to attribute that status to 
some potential applicants or that are grounded in forms of behaviour that express an 
objectionable meaning, and secondly, we should respect each person’s agency by giving 
due weight to the agency-related interests of employers, potential applicants, and 
recipients in the process of selection.25 Taken together, these requirements would explain 
the significance of conditions (1)–(3) in my account of how we should distinguish 
illegitimate from legitimate reaction qualifications. According to the pluralist theory of 
justice that I have outlined, allowing recipients’ responses to individuals with a particular 
natural appearance to count in selecting for jobs when they do not possess any reason for 
their responses may involve a failure to respect the agency of the applicants, whereas no 
such disrespect is involved in allowing recipients’ responses to the exercise of particular 
natural abilities (for example, those which enable a person to be a good mimic) to affect 
an applicant’s chances of obtaining a job that involves the exercise of those abilities even 
if the recipients do not possess any reasons for their responses. 
 
  
                                                 
25For the idea that we should respect each person’s agency in the process of selection, see G. Sher, 
‘Qualifications, fairness, and desert’, Equal Opportunity, ed. N. Bowie (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1988); Mason, Levelling the Playing Field, pp. 56–64. 
